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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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TO: National Estimates Board

FROM: Chief, Estimates Staff

SUBJECT: The Yugoslavia Position vis-a-vis the Satellites.

The Estimates Staff has prepared for your information
the following intelligence appreciation.

1. Tension between Yugoslavia and its Soviet Satellite neighbors remains high, but there are no reliable indications of an imminent Satellite attack. On the contrary, increasing Yugoslav ties with the West and the increasing Western commitment to Yugoslavia, particularly the initiation of arms aid to Yugoslavia, should serve to emphasize to the Kremlin the risks of general conflict inherent in any attack on Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leaders themselves apparently do not fear an attack in the immediate future, and have noted no change in Soviet and Satellite troop dispositions along the Yugoslav border since April. The Yugoslav leaders are nevertheless cognizant of the threat and are proceeding with steps to improve their position vis-a-vis the Satellites. Their attitude lacks the sense of frustration, evident early in the year, and is rather a calm and prudent approach looking toward the effective defense of Yugoslavia in both short and long range terms.

2. Of particular interest in connection with the Yugoslav attitude is the formation in Yugoslavia of an Albanian Exile Committee. Earlier in the year, Yugoslav leaders expressed considerable concern that activities of Albanian exiles in Italy might create a situation within Albania which would afford the USSR a pretext for an

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
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attack on Yugoslavia. The fact that Yugoslavia itself has now undertaken to sponsor resistance activities in Albania may indicate that Yugoslav leaders are now less concerned with the possibility of a Soviet attack.

3. Within the Satellites, the strengthening of Satellite armed forces has continued, but these measures may well be of a long range nature rather than indicative of an early attack. In Bulgaria, call-ups and releases are under way which will probably result in a net increase in the size of the Army. The releases, however, are of the best trained conscripts in the army. The Hungarian Army, now totalling 9 line divisions, is believed to be near the limit of its current expansion. The over-all disposition of these divisions does not indicate tactical preparation for attack on Yugoslavia. However, recent reports from Rumania indicate large scale evacuation of the areas bordering Yugoslavia which could be designed to conceal military preparations along the border. Border incidents along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border have increased (there were 27 in May), but the number of incidents on the Hungarian and Rumanian border has apparently not increased. Incidents on the Bulgarian border may be connected with recent defections from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia.

4. The re-equipment of Soviet Air Force fighter units in Austria and Hungary, and perhaps in Rumania as well, is apparently proceeding at an accelerated pace. There are no reliable reports, however, of jet aircraft in the Satellite air forces.

5. Satellite propaganda against Yugoslavia continues at much the same high level attained in March. There have, however, been few recent references to "Operation Lightning," the alleged Greek-Yugoslav plan to attack Albania.



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